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3. Communist intelligence in Korea forewarns of UN bombing raid: On 27 August a message [redacted] stated that a "large UN naval air raid would take place," apparently on 28 August. The incomplete intercept did not mention the targets to be attacked. (CANOE [redacted] 1055, [redacted], 27 Aug 52)

Comment: This is the first intelligence noted being passed on the Soviet early warning net. No major naval air strikes took place on 28 August. On 29 August, however, UN naval aircraft participated in the major air attack on Pyongyang and on 1 September carrier-based aircraft carried out an extensive raid in northeastern Korea.

4. Newly identified Chinese Communist air division equipped with ground attack aircraft: At least five "batches" of IL-10 conventional ground attack aircraft flew from Hsueh to the Peiping area on 2 September. These aircraft were observed to be part of the Chinese Communist 22nd Air Division. (CANOE AF Roundup 172, 5 Sept 52)

Comment: The 22nd Air Division only recently has been identified in Chinese Communist air traffic and so far no information as to its internal organization has been available. This message provides the first indication that the

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22nd Division is composed of conventional ground attack planes.

5. Soviet GCI stations in Korea located with searchlight units: US Air Force analysis of messages [redacted]

[redacted] in northwestern Korea reveals that at least nine radar-equipped GCI stations are associated with searchlight units. Three major stations, at Pyongyang, Sinanju, and Sonchon, each control two searchlight units and six lesser stations along the coast from Sinuiju to Pyongyang control one unit each. (CANOE AF Roundup 171, 4 Sept 52)

Comment: A Soviet early warning radar installation at Huichon in north central Korea has been noted in connection with two Chinese searchlight companies and with a radio-range station.

The largely ineffective Communist night air interception effort in Korea has apparently been geared to the use of radar-controlled searchlights.

6. Additional Chinese artillery moving toward the Korean front: A series of late August and early September messages from a Chinese regiment, possibly the 3rd Engineers, and believed to be located near Tokchon on the Taedong River in northwestern Korea, reveals a strenuous supply and reinforcing effort in August.

Messages of 4 September and 26 August reveal that from 1 to 25 August over 670 trucks, 5,000 men, hundreds of horses, and many tons of food and equipment had been ferried by the unit across the river.

Of greater interest, however, the messages indicate that a considerable amount of artillery had been moved across the river. Specifically mentioned are four battalions of Soviet 122mm gun-howitzers, a battalion of heavy 120mm mortars, a battalion of 57mm anti-tank guns, and a battalion of anti-aircraft artillery pieces and machine guns. (CANOE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, L [redacted] T255, 26 Aug; L [redacted] T259, 26 Aug; L [redacted] T283, 28 Aug; L [redacted] T304, 29 Aug; L [redacted] T325, 31 Aug; L [redacted] T373, 1 Sept; L [redacted] T392, 4 Sept; L [redacted] T393, 4 Sept 52)

Comment: The Chinese are apparently augmenting their already considerable artillery force deployed at the front. It is possible that these battalions represent replacements rather than reinforcements.

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7. Communist alarm over UN amphibious intentions reaches new high: Although the enemy has been constantly alert against any attempted UN amphibious operations, three messages of late August and early September demonstrate the degree to which their fear of such an operation has grown.

The earliest one, of 24 August, is from the North Korean 21st Brigade in the west. This alert of coastal defense battalions cites a menacing statement allegedly made on 22 August by the "Commander of the 9th US Combined Special Fleet" relative to operations with the US 1st Cavalry Division, an intercepted order for "the enemy special intelligence unit" to collect information "immediately" on Communist troop deployment, and finally, an apparent intercept of a US Air Force message which stated that the Ongjin-Yonan area in the west was the "strategic point on the coast." On 4 September, the situation was believed so serious that the brigade chief of staff ordered a battalion commander to "lay the anti-tank mines. . . where enemy tanks are expected" and to "prepare for destroying the roads and bridges." This message states that "the enemies are. . . southeast of Yonan," presumably at sea.

In the east near Wonsan, the North Korean 7th Division received "information from the Allied Headquarters. . . on 28 August, (that) the enemy, having failed in the plot to bear down on us by the Kaesong negotiations and the air pressure, has assembled a strength of approximately two divisions." The message continues that this force may make a landing near Wonsan and warns that "we should prepare for combat, perfectly and firmly." (CANOE ASAPAC Japan, G [] T49, 24 Aug; 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, SK-N-74, 3 Sept; SK-N-83, 4 Sept 52)

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