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28 July 1950

HR70-14

SOVIET/SATELLITE INTENTIONS

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As the USSR and its Satellites continued to talk loudly of "peace" and the warlike intentions of the Western "imperialists," there was no slackening of reports that the USSR itself was preparing to initiate further aggressive moves around the Soviet perimeter. Although possessing the capability to move militarily in a number of places with little advance warning, with the possible exception of continued preparations for an attack on Taiwan, the USSR has not yet given any firm indication of its intention to expand the Korean conflict and increase the risk of global warfare involving the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, Soviet diplomatic activity was aimed primarily at South Asia and the Soviet Far East.

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Korean Support Although there has been no evidence of troop movements from Manchuria into northern Korea since the outbreak of hostilities, North Korean forces may soon be reinforced by Korean veterans of the Chinese Communist Army. Within the next three weeks, North Korean forces will probably have made the maximum advance possible with the troops currently available in Korea. If the USSR desires a quick victory before UN forces are further reinforced, it will have to call upon additional experienced troops for use in Korea. Although the North Koreans may have committed practically all their available organized and trained units merely to achieve a quick victory regardless of the risk, it seems more probable that the Northern Command has been assured of reinforcements. Such reinforcements would at the minimum consist of the 40-50,000 Koreans believed to be available in Manchuria and would be used to replace the heavy casualties resulting from the rapid North Korean advance, to cover the exposed flanks and rear, and, if necessary, to provide momentum for the final push against reinforced UN troops. The USSR could use these "Korean"

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reinforcements with little danger of political repercussions. There is at present no indication, however, as to whether the USSR will risk the political disadvantages involved in committing non-Korean reinforcements should such a step become necessary.

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